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Oyewale TomoriAbstract
The Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak in the three West Africa countries of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, was
declared by the World Health Organization (WHO) as a public health event of international concern in August 2014.
The disease, which has caused more than 10,000 deaths from over 25,000 cases, has thrived on a failed disease
control system, national denial, and a poor and fragile healthcare delivery system. The slow and initially uncoordinated
national and global response turned the outbreak into an unprecedented humanitarian disaster. Prevention and control
of future outbreaks depend on improving and upgrading disease surveillance into a responsive component of a reliable
and efficient health care delivery system. Appropriate capacity building with a conducive operating environment, which
has been lacking in the past few decades, will be key to the health system strengthening.
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The World Health Organization (WHO) declared the
2014 Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak a public health
event of international concern 8 months after the index
case occurred and 5 months after it was officially re-
ported [1]. Three countries (Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra
Leone) bore the greatest burden of the epidemic, while
three other West African countries (Mali, Nigeria, and
Senegal) successfully contained the importation of the
disease. In addition to the outbreaks in West African
countries, the disease was also imported to the USA,
UK, and Spain [2]. During the same period, another
EVD outbreak unrelated to the West African outbreaks
and which was successfully contained occurred in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) [3]. As of
April 15, 2015, the reported number of cases associated
with the West African epidemic, which has gone on for the
last 16 months, is 25,826 cases with 10,704 deaths [4].
This commentary focuses on issues, generally not pub-
licly discussed, but which have perennially hampered the
ability of many African countries to effectively control
disease outbreaks. Addressing these issues, and theCorrespondence: oyewaletomori@gmail.com
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equip African countries to prevent a repeat of the
current humanitarian disaster.
The index case for the current epidemic
The index case of the current West African EVD out-
break is considered to be a 2-year-old boy infected in
Meliandou, near Gueckedou, in Guinea, in December
2013 [5]. The WHO was notified late in March 2014, by
which time, Guinea had recorded 49 cases and 29 deaths
[6]. On August 8, 2014, with a total of 1,779 cases and
961 deaths in Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria
[1], the WHO declared the EVD outbreak a public health
event of international concern, that is, an ‘extraordinary
event’ and a public health risk to other States [1].
The Nigerian Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak
The Nigerian index case of EVD was an individual who
had visited and cared for a sibling who died from the
disease in Liberia [7,8]. He travelled to Lagos, Nigeria,
on a commercial flight, arriving on July 20, 2014, by
which time he was acutely ill, and was admitted to a
private hospital with fever, vomiting, and diarrhea [7,8].
He was initially treated for malaria having denied any
exposure to EVD. His failure to respond to malaria treat-
ment and his arrival from an EVD-affected country ledis an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
rg/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
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tests confirmed the diagnosis, and local public health
authorities were alerted of the case of EVD [7,8]. The
patient died on July 25, 2014.
The limited spread of EVD in Nigeria was a combin-
ation of fortuitous circumstances and the institution of a
rapid and aggressive public health and infection control
measures. The index case, a diplomat, was sick on arrival
in Lagos, at a time when doctors were on strike and gov-
ernment hospitals closed. He was subsequently admitted
to a private hospital, where he was the source of infec-
tion for nine of the hospital workers, and who were then
sources of infection for five others [7,8]. This is in
addition to two of the protocol officers who attended to
him at the airport. One of those EVD infected protocol
officers later escaped the Lagos Emergency Operations
Centre (EOC) contact tracing network and travelled to
Port Harcourt, where he initiated another chain of infec-
tions, involving three cases [7,8].
On July 23, 2015, the Nigerian authorities declared an
EVD emergency, and activated the EOC to rapidly re-
spond to the outbreak. In collaboration with partner
agencies, the government, using existing public health
assets, was able to set up six response teams, namely
i) point of entry, ii) epidemiology/surveillance, iii) case
management/infection control, iv) laboratory services,
v) social mobilization, and vi) management/coordination,
to rapidly contain the epidemic. When WHO declared
Nigeria free of EVD [9] on October 20, 2014, the EOC
had identified 894 contacts in three states (Lagos, Rivers,
and Enugu), making approximately 18,500 face-to-face
contact visits. There were a total of 20 confirmed or
probable EVD cases, of whom eight died [7].
Therefore, despite the success of Nigeria in containing
the EVD outbreak, the country had committed certain
errors which cannot be repeated if future epidemics are
to be rapidly contained. In these instances, there was a
delay in providing funds for the early and crucial activ-
ities of the EOC. Official pre-outbreak information pro-
vided to the public was incorrect, creating a false sense
of confidence regarding government preparedness for
controlling EVD.
EVD is no stranger to Africa
Since 1976, when EVD was first discovered in Africa,
there have been 24 other outbreaks, aside from the
current West African outbreak, with a total of 2,900
cases and 1,583 deaths [10]. As of April 15, 2015, the
current outbreaks have accounted for around ten times
this number: 25,826 cases and 10,704 deaths [4]. Several
reasons have been given for the current unprecedented
and prolonged EVD outbreak. These factors include,
among others, i) the unreliable disease surveillance sys-
tem which failed to detect and notify the outbreak atonset; ii) an official national and community denial of
the occurrence of the epidemic; iii) the fragile and weak
heath care delivery system which was incapable of man-
aging the cases and containing the epidemic; iv) cultural
practices associated with unsafe burial ceremonies; and
v) ease and rapid mass movement of people between
rural areas and urban centres, as well as across largely
uncontrolled international borders.
Initial international response to the outbreak was
described by Médecins Sans Frontières as “slow and
derisory, ..... irresponsible” [11]. When international re-
sponse was eventually in place, it was uncoordinated,
making the initial global effort seem like a “consortium
of confusion”.
Unapproved EVD drugs and vaccines, Africa’s
magic bullet, or is there another way?
Having failed to apply standard infection control guide-
lines to contain the epidemic, frantic efforts were made
at global level. The focus temporarily shifted to using
available, but unapproved, therapies on compassionate
grounds [12]. Therefore, efforts were redoubled to find
the ‘magic bullet’, namely drugs and vaccines, for the
treatment of cases and to stem the tide of the epidemic.
It is becoming clear, with the reduction in number of
cases in Liberia and Sierra Leone, that this ‘magic bullet’
to bring the epidemic under control does not consist of
drugs or vaccines, but rather a combination of aggressive
contact tracing, isolation, and treatment of cases, safe
burial ceremonies, and provision of adequate and correct
information.
Capacity building and capacity enablement
Since 1976, when an EVD outbreak was first reported,
Africa has battled with no less than 24 episodes of EVD
outbreaks [10]. These outbreaks should have provided
Africa with opportunities for developing appropriate
capacity and enhancing competence needed to deal with
any EVD or other disease outbreaks. However, in all the
reported EVD outbreaks occurring in Africa for last
38 years, Africa has been at the receiving end of inter-
national aid and assistance.
These long years of international aid and assistance for
capacity building of Africans in disease control and re-
sponse, have not actually yielded the desired result on
building human resource capacity. This failure to build
appropriate capacity is aptly illustrated by an extract
from the published diary of a WHO expert, who is
assisting with the control of several EVD and other viral
hemorrhagic fever outbreaks in Africa. He wrote “We
received the first emails on the Guinea event on Friday
14 March. During the weekend, I was travelling in the
DRC for a training course on how to take blood samples
in Ebola. It was a 3-day training course” [13]. It is
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training in ‘how to take blood samples in Ebola’ is the
type of external technical assistance offered to health
workers in DRC, a country where 38 years ago, the first
EVD case was detected, and which has brought under
control at least seven other EVD outbreaks [14]. DRC
nationals have provided and continue to provide tech-
nical assistance to other African countries on EVD
control.
By its nature and character, international assistance or
aid, be it for economic development or research collab-
oration, tends to benefit the donor more than the recipi-
ent. A Director of a UK funded research center in
Africa, wrote this piece in an annual report of the
center: “Perhaps the most important achievement of the
Unit during the past five years has been the training of a
group of dedicated scientists and clinicians who have
gone on to establish their own highly successful groups
elsewhere in the tropics and in the UK and who continue
to maintain the high reputation of the UK in tropical
medicine” [15].
This is not an isolated case. A cursory review of the
activities of foreign funded research centres in Africa
revealed that scientists of the donor countries have
benefitted more than their African counterparts in areas
of research publication, competition for grants, and
international recognition [16]. In many international
conferences where issues concerning diseases of African
origin and which are endemic in Africa, most, if not all
the researchers and paper presenters are non-Africans.
The disease outbreaks in Africa have become opportun-
ities for foreign researchers to fine-tune their skills,
enabling them to solve African problems, doing for
Africa what African scientists should be doing for Africa.
Meanwhile, African scientists remain dependent on
the crumbs from the tables of external donors; reduced
to mere sample collectors and impotent contributors to
disease prevention and control efforts locally or globally.
If the next epidemic is not to catch Africa unprepared,
this character and nature of external aid and assistance
for research collaboration with Africa must change. To
reduce dependence on external aid, Africa must reorgan-
ize her priorities, and invest more funds in research and
research capacity building. African governments must
create a conducive environment for African scientists to
function with relevance, effectively and productively,
freed from the bondage of dependency on foreign exter-
nal support. On their part, developed countries should
ease off on their dominance and control of the
processes of global disease surveillance and create an
atmosphere for genuine collaboration based on mu-
tual appreciation and respect [17]. Only then can
developing countries truly ‘own’ the processes of estab-
lishing a sustainable and reliable disease surveillancesystem for the prevention and control of disease and
contribute to global health.
Conclusions
Even as agencies, foundations, governments, and institu-
tions outside Africa are holding meetings to assess the
lessons learnt from the EVD disaster and map out strat-
egies for better response and control of future epi-
demics, EVD devastated African countries are enmeshed
in other battles – misuse of EVD funds [18,19] and the
inability to fully utilize aid and resources donated by
international agencies. Therefore, is Africa prepared for
the next epidemic? Has Africa learnt important lessons
from the current EVD outbreak in West Africa? Will
Africa still be helpless and totally dependent on inter-
national agencies for assistance to control any future
epidemic? Will the scientists and governments of the
developed world continue to so control the processes of
a sustainable global disease surveillance system, leaving
no meaningful role for participants from the developing
countries? The answers of a pessimist would be no to
the first two and yes to the last two questions. For the
opposite to occur, Africa must accept that her self-
imposed poverty status is not due to a lack of resources,
but rather to their misuse, and that it can be reversed.
This requires purposeful leadership and rightly guided
followership. The African researcher or scientist must
evaluate the needs of the society and become relevant to
the society through adaptation and development of tech-
nologies that positively impact on the daily life of citi-
zens. The poor standard of living and status of life in
Africa places an extra burden on the African researcher
or scientist that transcends the confines of learning and
expertise. The researcher or scientist must take on the
extra roles of guide, teacher, mentor, and beacon to
society. Therein lies the true relevance of the African
scientist or researcher. International aid will not build
the capacity for such desired relevance; it must be
funded with home-based resources and through govern-
ments with the right priorities.
Competing interests
The author declares that he has no competing interests.
Author’s information
OT graduated with a veterinary degree in 1971 from the Ahmadu Bello
University Zaria, before obtaining a PhD in Virology in 1976 from the
University of Ibadan, both in Nigeria. He was a faculty member of the
Department of Virology, University of Ibadan, from 1971–1994, becoming
Professor of Virology in 1981 and Head of the Department of Virology and
Director of the Postgraduate Institute for Medical Research and Training at
the College of Medicine, University of Ibadan, between 1986 and 1993.
During his period at the University of Ibadan, he was involved in disease
investigations and control of epidemics, elucidating the properties of new
viruses, and in the training of students at undergraduate and postgraduate
levels. In 1994, he joined the WHO Africa Region, where he served as the
Regional Virologist and Laboratory Coordinator up till 2004. During this
10 year period, he was involved in the setting up of the African Regional
Tomori BMC Medicine  (2015) 13:116 Page 4 of 4Polio Laboratory Network, enhancing national scientific and research capacity
for diagnosis and control of polio and viral hemorrhagic diseases (Yellow
fever, Marburg, EVD, etc.) in Africa. He served as pioneer Vice Chancellor from
2004–2011 at the Redeemer’s University, a private faith-based institution in
Nigeria. He serves on various national and international bodies (WHO, IOM, etc.)
concerned with national and global control of infectious diseases. He currently
serves as the President of the Nigerian Academy of Science.
Received: 1 May 2015 Accepted: 1 May 2015
References
1. WHO. Statement on the 1st meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee on
the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa. 2014. www.who.int/mediacentre/
news/statements/2014/ebola-20140808/en/.
2. WHO. Ebola response roadmap – Update 10 October 2014. 2014.
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/136161/1/roadmapupdate
10Oct14_eng.pdf?ua=1.
3. WHO. Ebola virus disease – Democratic Republic of Congo 10 September
2014. 2014 http://www.who.int/csr/don/2014_09_10_ebola/en/.
4. WHO. Ebola situation report – 15 April 2015. http://apps.who.int/ebola/
current-situation/ebola-situation-report-15-april-2015.
5. Baize S, Pannetier D, Oestereich L, Rieger T, Koivogui L, Magassouba N, et al.
Emergence of Zaire Ebola virus disease in Guinea. N Engl J Med.
2014;371:1418–25.
6. WHO. Ebola virus disease in Guinea – Disease Outbreak News – 23 March 2014.
2014. http://www.who.int/csr/don/2014_03_23_ebola/en/.
7. Shuaib F, Gunnala R, Musa EO, Mahoney FJ, Oguntimehin O, Nguku PM,
et al. Centers for Disease Control and prevention (CDC). Ebola virus disease
outbreak – Nigeria, July–September 2014. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep.
2014;63:867–72.
8. Fasina F, Shittu A, Lazarus D, Tomori O, Simonsen L, Viboud C, et al.
Transmission dynamics and control of Ebola virus disease outbreak in
Nigeria, July to September 2014. Euro Surveill. 2014;19:20920.
9. WHO. WHO declares end of Ebola outbreak in Nigeria. 2015. http://
www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/nigeria-ends-ebola/en/.
10. WHO. Ebola Virus Disease Fact Sheet no. 103. 2015. http://www.who.int/
mediacentre/factsheets/fs103/en/.
11. Nierle T, Jochum B. Ebola: the failures of the international outbreak
response. 2014. http://www.msf.org/article/ebola-failures-international-
outbreak-response.
12. WHO. Ethical considerations for use of unregistered interventions for
Ebola virus disease (EVD) Summary of the panel discussion. 2014.
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/ebola-ethical-
review-summary/en/.
13. Formenty P. Ebola diaries: First signals – March 2014. 2015. http://www.who.int/
features/2015/ebola-diaries-formenty/en/.
14. Muyembe-Tamfum JJ, Mulangu S, Masumu J, Kayembe JM, Kemp A,
Paweska JT. Ebola virus outbreaks in Africa: past and present. Onderstepoort
J Vet Res. 2012;79:6–13.
15. Greenwood BM. From the Director Gambia: Medical Research Council Unit;
Annual Report for. 1995.
16. Adubifa AO. An assessment of science and technology capacity building in
sub-Saharan Africa. Nairobi: African Technology Policy Studies Network
(ATPS) Special Paper Series No. 19; 2004.
17. Tomori O. Winning the battle against emerging pathogens. Bull At Sci.
2014;70:14–7.
18. Paye-Layleh J. Associated Press 2015 - Liberia Audit Report Questions
$673,000 in Ebola Spending APRIL 15, 2015, 3:50 P.M. E.D.T. http://
www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/04/15/world/africa/ap-af-ebola-west-
africa.html?_r=0.
19. Millions in Ebola funds unaccounted for in Sierra Leone. http://www.dw.de/
millions-in-ebola-funds-unaccounted-for-in-sierra-leone/a-18257589.Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color ﬁgure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
